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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IDENTITY AND MARKET FOR LOYALTIES THEORIES: THE CASE
FOR FREE INFORMATION FLOW IN INSURGENT IRAQ

PAUL D. CALLISTER*
“Boys who want to become fighters have to smash their television sets. . . .
Only then are they considered worthy of becoming mujahideen.” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
When monopoly control over the flow of information is lost, the
unavoidable consequence is destabilization. The flow of information through a
society can be understood as a market—not a market exchanging cash for
goods, but loyalty for identity. 2 Hence, the market is called the “Market for
Loyalties.” 3 The suppliers of identity, who demand loyalty in return, are
governments, political parties, opposition groups, insurgents, tribes, religious
orders, corporations, militaries, or any other group demanding loyalty (military
service, payment of taxes, religious adherence, market share, brand loyalty,
etc.) in return for their wares. 4 What these suppliers peddle is identity—
roughly the hope, dreams, and aspirations about who one is in relation to
society and the past, present, and future. 5 Loyalty is then exchanged for this
identity, and the market for their exchange is found in the information channels

* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Leon E. Bloch Law Library, University of
Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. B.A. Brigham Young University, J.D. Cornell Law
School, M.S (Library and Information Science) University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This
article would not have been written but for the insightful help and skillful expertise of Captain
Don Smith, U.S. Army, Foreign Military Studies Office. The author also thanks Professor Nancy
Levit of the UMKC School of Law, Dr. Montgomery McFate, from the Institute of Defense
Analyses, his research assistants, Elizabeth Van Horn and Askley Jackson, and the librarians and
staff of the UMKC School of Law.
1. JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD: WHY RELIGIOUS MILITANTS KILL 114
(2003) (interview with mujaheed in Lahore, Pakistan).
2. Monroe E. Price, The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global
Competition for Allegiances, 104 YALE L.J. 667, 669 (1994) [hereinafter Market for Loyalties].
3. The theory was initially developed by Monroe E. Price, to whom the author is
particularly indebted. Id. at 668-70.
4. See id. at 669.
5. For a discussion of the concept of identity, see infra section II.B and accompanying
notes.
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of a society. 6 Hence, a loss of control over these channels is a loss of
monopoly control over the market. Consequently, Western television and
models of education appear as threats in some markets. As one mujahideen
unapologetically and unambiguously confessed, “‘free secular education for
all’ leading to an ‘increase in the literacy rate’ is the gravest threat to the . . .
jihadi groups in Pakistan.” 7
In post-invasion Iraq, Saddam Hussein loses monopoly control over the
information market, where loyalty and identity are exchanged. As a
consequence, the loyalty that the former régime commands (in exchange for its
marketed form of identity) plummets. Into this vacuum step new sellers, as the
populous scrambles to find new suppliers and better exchange rates for
identity. Indeed, in many areas the old supplier (Saddam’s Baathist party) has
been completely swept away, and in others, competitors with the Baathists
(such as nationalists, “tribalists,” fundamentalist Islamic movements, terrorist
cells, etc.) emerge willing to barter at more favorable rates of exchange. The
result of the sudden opening of the market is chaotic and violent. New
suppliers of identity hawk wares so potent, that the consumer’s loyalty extends
to martyrdom in the form of suicide bombing—all for a few moments of
temporal fame and bright prospects of rewards in eternity.
The current market for loyalties in Iraq is complicated by an additional
characteristic—the impact of tribal structures to limit the number of effective
buyers in the marketplace. Tribes function as brokers, restricting the presence
of competing buyers and functioning as resellers of identity in the
marketplace. 8 Unlike traditional brokers in markets exchanging cash for goods
or services, the costs of changing tribal brokers may lock individuals into tribal
units, with significant implications on the market for exchange of loyalty and
identity. 9 Consequently, both the “wholesale” and “retail” markets need to be
discussed to understand the implications of radical changes in Iraq’s
information environment.
6. Paul D. Callister, The Internet, Regulation and the Market for Loyalties: An Economic
Analysis of Transborder Information Flow, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 59, 81-82.
7. STERN, supra note 1, at 230 (interview with a militant at a madrassah—a religious
school, in Lahore, Pakistan). Apparently, others at the school also indicated that “education” was
the largest threat. See id.
8. See Neil MacFarquhar, In Iraq’s Tribes, U.S. Faces a Formidable Wild Card, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at 10; GlobalSecurity.org, Military: Societal Framework,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/society.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
9. For example, residents in Baghdad often patronize shops and restaurants of the same
tribe. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Iraqi Wild Card: Tribal Loyalties Hard to Predict, WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 2003, at A1. To betray one’s tribe would have serious repercussions. In fact,
when Hussein’s sons-in-law returned to Iraq from Jordan, after betraying secrets about Iraqi
weapon’s program, they were killed, not by “police or the military, but [by] members of their
own tribe seeking to redeem the family’s honor.” Id. But see infra note 85 for a discussion of
instances when tribal relationships are altered or fictionalized.
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The dilemma for the United States is what to do about the new information
market in Iraq—to clamp down and re-exert monopoly control, to stand back
laissez-faire-like and let the market take its natural course, or to somehow
manage the slide to equilibrium by carefully eliminating barriers and
engineering the emergence of competitors in the market. This article will first
present the theoretical underpinning of the market for loyalties in terms of
neoclassical economics, emphasizing the importance of identity in this market.
Second, it will apply the theory to understanding many of the instabilities in
Iraq and the Middle East. Third, the article suggests implications of the market
for loyalties for U.S. policy. The article concludes that despite consideration
of tribal intermediation of the information market, which must and can be
addressed, U.S. policy is not to win Iraqi loyalty by promulgating its own
particular message of identity but to create and maintain an open and
pluralistic market for loyalties within Iraq’s information environment. In such
a market, diverse identities are sufficiently numerous to insulate the market
from potential disruption caused by provocative messages hawked by radical
and violent groups. In essence, this Article presents an argument for freedom
of speech and information flow based upon market for loyalties theory.
II. THE “MARKET FOR LOYALTIES” AND “IDENTITY THEORY”
Market for loyalties theory was originally developed by Monroe Price to
explain government behavior in regulating, censoring, and technologically
blocking radio, cable, and satellite broadcasting. 10 In a previous paper, the
author applied market for loyalties theory to the Internet, focusing on the
consequences of a loss of monopoly control over information flow, which are
predicted by application of Price’s theory. 11 While Professor Price has written

10. Monroe Price is the Joseph and Sadie Danciger Professor of Law, Director of the
Howard M. Squadron Program in Law, Media, and Society and a past Dean of the Cardozo
School of Law. See, e.g., MONROE E. PRICE, TELEVISION: THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY 67-74 (1995) [hereinafter TELEVISION]; Monroe E. Price, Law, Force and the Russian
Media, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 795, 801-802 (1995); MONROE E. PRICE, The Market for
Loyalties and the Uses of Comparative Media Law, in BROADCASTING REFORM IN INDIA: MEDIA
LAW FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 93, 93-103 (Monroe E. Price & Stefaan G. Verhulst eds.,
1998) [hereinafter BROADCASTING REFORM IN INDIA]; MONROE E. PRICE, MEDIA AND
SOVEREIGNTY: THE GLOBAL INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND ITS CHALLENGE TO STATE
POWER 32-33 (2002) [hereinafter MEDIA AND SOVEREIGNTY]; Market for Loyalties, supra note 2,
at 667-68; Monroe E. Price, The Market for Loyalties and the Uses of Comparative Media Law, 5
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 445, 445-59 (1997) [hereinafter Comparative Media Law];
Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technologies, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1895-96
(2001).
11. See Callister, supra note 6, at 90-104 (applying market for loyalties theory to the
breakdown of monopoly control and the Internet). Monroe Price first considered the implications
of the Internet in MEDIA AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 18. He has also written about the
Internet, but without specific application of the market for loyalties theory. See MONROE E.
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extensively on the regulation of cable, satellite, and radio broadcasting to the
Middle East, 12 this author’s prior application of the theory to the loss of
monopoly control and the Internet has not previously extended to the Middle
East, the war on terrorism, or the occupation of Iraq. The neoclassical
elements of Price’s economic model and their extension to the loss of
monopoly control are summarized below. The essential theory is then applied
to tribal societies in the context of wholesale and resale markets. Finally, the
validity of such economic analysis to information studies is reviewed.
A.

The Basic Elements of the Market for Loyalties

The elements of the market for loyalties are familiar to anyone with a
background in economics. To understand the application of economic theory
to information environments, the following table is helpful:
Economic Term
Market for Loyalties
Sellers
Governments and Power Holders
Buyers
Citizens
Price/Currency
Loyalty
Goods
Identity
TABLE 1—ECONOMIC TERMS IN MARKET FOR LOYALTIES
In the market for loyalties, goods and services are not exchanged for cash,
although such elements may be present in the market. 13 Rather, governments
and other aspiring power holders demand loyalty in exchange for identity (a
connection to the legacy, resources, protection, hopes, and aspirations of the
groups they represent). 14 To maximize the loyalty (in terms of taxes, votes,
product preferences, military service, etc.), it is natural that governments and
power-holders would seek to exclude competitors from the market by
controlling the information channels and communications which permit the
market to function. 15 The consequence is a monopolization of the market for
loyalties, which is illustrated by the following chart:

PRICE & STEFAAN G. VERHULST, SELF-REGULATION AND THE INTERNET (2005); Monroe E.
Price, Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of International Broadcasting, 21 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L. J. 51, 72-77 (2003).
12. See BROADCASTING REFORM IN INDIA, supra note 11, at 95; MEDIA AND SOVEREIGNTY,
supra note 11, at 36-37; TELEVISION, supra note 11, at 69-70; Comparative Media Law, supra
note 11, at 448; Market for Loyalties, supra note 2, at 673.
13. See TELEVISION, supra note 11, at 62.
14. Market for Loyalties, supra note 2, at 669.
15. Callister, supra note 6, at 87-88.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

IDENTITY AND MARKET FOR LOYALTIES THEORIES

127

FIGURE 1—UNITARY DEMAND CURVE
If a government has established monopoly control in the market for
loyalties by controlling information flow, it is able to get a high price in loyalty
in exchange for relatively little output or quantity of identity. The Monopoly
Point, represented by points Q m and P m in Figure 1, is determined as a point on
the demand curve, directly above the intersection of the Marginal Cost Curve
(the same as the competitive supply curve) and the monopolist’s Marginal
Revenue Curve. However, if monopoly control is lost, the exchange rate will
descend along the demand curve to the Competition Point, with the price of
loyalty falling to point P c and quantity of identity increasing to point Q c . The
Competition Point is the intersection of the competitive supply curves and
demand curves.
The descent from P m to P c , if significant, is destabilizing. It represents the
failure of a government or reigning oligarchic powers to raise taxes, enlist
soldiers, and otherwise gather support. For example, Western media (rock ‘n
roll and blue jeans) is believed to have weakened the resolve of former Soviet
citizens to support their Kremlin. 16 China has also recognized the influence of
Western media as a threat to the loyalty owed by its citizens to the motherland:

16. Comparative Media Law, supra note 11, at 453-54 (citing SUBCOMM. ON INT’L
OPERATIONS, H.R., 102D CONG., REP. OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON U.S. GOVERNMENT
INT’L BROADCASTING (Comm. Print 1992)). Ironically, Western media may also have weakened
the resolve to support modern democratic institutions:
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International satellite dissemination conducted by Western developed countries
threatens the independence and identity of China’s national culture. We
should seriously deal with this situation . . . . These [cultural] factors include
loving the motherland, hard work, advocating industry and thrift . . . taking a
keen interest in science, attaching importance to culture . . . and stressing
moral courage . . . . The national spirit contains patriotism, collectivism, hard
work [sic] and bravery, defying brutal force and daring to fight . . . . Precisely
because of this, we take seriously the infringement of overseas radio and
television and the influence they bring which hampers the national spirit to
expand. 17

Media, particularly Western media, can diminish the loyalty commanded by
authoritarian states (such as manifest through patriotism, self-sacrifice,
willingness to fight, etc.), and, if extreme, can destabilize such a régime. 18
Not surprisingly, Islamic countries have also been concerned with Western
broadcasting. 19 Indeed, a Kuwaiti government minister blamed the spread of
Islamic extremism in his own country on the media:
[F]illing the foreign public space with Wheel of Fortune and the throbbing and distracting
siren songs of MTV might subvert or inhibit the building of democratic practices. The job
of being a citizen in a transitional society would be tough and grueling [sic], demanding
full attention to the structure of government and society. An overly zealous commercial
culture . . . would pre-empt the development of an adequately functional political culture.
TELEVISION, supra note 11, at 21-22, 250 n.2 (referring to a panel discussion at a conference of
the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, The New Global Popular Culture:
Is it American? Is it Good for America? Is it Good for the World? (Mar. 10, 1992)). “The
concern is whether the diminution of loyalty to traditional government authority as a result of
Western media ultimately makes the establishment of new democratic institutions more difficult.”
Callister, supra note 6, at 86 n.125.
17. Zhao Shuifu, Foreign Dominance of Chinese Broadcasting—Will Hearts and Minds
Follow?, INTERMEDIA 8, 9 (1994). China has not chosen to isolate itself from Western culture.
Rather, it has exercised paternalistic control over foreign influences. See Callister, supra note 6,
at 87 n.126 (citing Shuifu, supra at 9 (“This requires us to analyze [sic] foreign culture and
differentiate with a serious and scientific attitude, and help audiences to absorb the essence and
discard the dross.”)).
18. See MEDIA AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 33.
19. See, e.g., Cable TV Programmes Should be According to Social, Religious Norms,
PAKISTAN PRESS INT’L, May 11, 2005, available at LEXIS, News & Business, News, Wire
Service Stories (“Due to Western and Indian channels, our society faces challenge [sic] of
consumerism and sensuality.”); Iran: Editor Calls For Action Against “Blasphemous” UK-Based
Satellite TV, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING: INT’L REP., Nov. 23, 2004, available at LEXIS,
News & Business, BBC Worldwide Monitoring: International Reports File (“The editor of a
conservative Iranian paper has published a strong condemnation of an unnamed UK-based
Persian-language satellite TV. He accused the British government of complicity in broadcasting
insults against Islam and suggested that a presenter on the channel should be shot.”); Majlis
Official Comments on Bill Banning Use of Satellite Programme Receivers, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec. 20, 1994, available at LEXIS, News & Business, BBC Worldwide
Monitoring: International Reports. Corruption is a frequent theme of criticisms of the influence
of Western media.
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The justice minister added that after the emergence of globalization and the
development of modern media, Western media gained control over societies,
including Islamic ones. He indicated that it is obvious that satellite channels
are partly responsible for moral corruption in the absence of media censorship,
which leads to the transfer and spread of thoughts in all countries. As a result,
young men travel with some people to states like Afghanistan, Iraq and others,
without their parents or the government being aware of it.
This is due to the thoughts and ideas received through the media and
satellite channels, the messages that some radicals send for transmission, and
the interviews carried by the satellite channels with some others, or due to
these young people’s financial capabilities, which allow them to travel and mix
with Western cultures that either permit moral corruption or allow the
promotion of radicalism. 20

The threat perceived by authoritarian states from media is a genuine concern.
Specifically, by diverting loyalties elsewhere, the threat is perceived to strike at
the heart of the state’s ability to command loyalty. Ironically, Western media
is blamed for facilitating access and receptiveness to extremist messages. 21
B.

The Importance of Identity

The concept of identity can be illuminated with respect to the aspirations
of sellers in the market for loyalties: “The sellers in this market [for loyalties]
are all those for whom myths and dreams and history can somehow be
converted into power and wealth—classically states, governments, interest
groups, businesses, and others.” 22 In short, the message of identity may
consist of a party platform, ideology, or national ideals and aspirations. It may
be as ephemeral as the hope for a better future or as concrete as the desire for a
national homeland. Identity is valuable to buyers as it contains both the legacy

Satellite transmission, broadcasting the programmes of foreign television networks, is not
designed to increase the scientific knowledge of nations. Rather it has been developed to
mislead youth . . . . They sell obscene films either at a very low price or give it to you
free of charge, whereas the scientific films are so expensive that one cannot afford to buy
them. They [the West] do not transfer their knowledge. They do not transfer their
experience of modernizing technology. What they transfer is something which drags
families into corruption.
Emani-Kashani: West Interest in Transfer Not of Technology But of Corruption, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 19, 1994, available at LEXIS, News & Business, BBC
Worldwide Monitoring: International Reports (brackets in original) (excerpting a prayer sermon
delivered by Ayatollah Mohammad Emami-Kashani on September 16, 1994 at Tehran University
and broadcast on the Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran).
20. Kuwaiti Justice Minister Blames Globalized Media for Rise in Youths’ Radicalism, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Jan. 20, 2005, available at LEXIS, News & Business, BBC
Monitoring: International Reports.
21. Id.
22. Market for Loyalties, supra note 2, at 669.
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of their past history and the promise of their dreams for the future (whether it
is for wealth, a better life, or an education). 23

The connection of the heritage of the past and dreams of a better or more
secure future are essential elements of the concept of identity.
Beyond market for loyalties theory, as traditionally applied in media law,
identity is emerging as a key component of our understanding of the
motivational forces behind terrorism. 24 In her insightful and compelling book,
Terrorism in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, Harvard
researcher Jessica Stern expressed the common theme found among religious
terrorist groups, based upon interviews with terrorists all over the world:
What seems to be most appealing about militant religious groups—whatever
combination of reasons an individual may cite for joining—is the way life is
simplified. Good and evil are brought out in stark relief. Life is transformed
through action. Martyrdom—the supreme act of heroism and worship—
provides the ultimate escape from life’s dilemmas, especially for individuals
who feel deeply alienated and confused, humiliated or desperate. 25

Stern focuses on alienation, humiliation, demographics, history, and territory
(each concept serving as a chapter of her book) 26 to explain the causes or
“grievances” that motivate religious terrorism. Each concept is profoundly
interconnected with the concept of identity. 27 As described by Stern,
“alienation” is the process used by one violent cult in the United States to
develop the “‘in group,’ foster group identity, dehumanize the group’s
purported enemies, and encourage the creation of a ‘killer self’ capable of
murdering large numbers of innocent people.” 28
“Humiliation” and lack of identity are apt descriptions of the profile given
by a General from the Palestinian Authority on Hamas suicide bombers:
Young, often a teenager.
He is mentally immature.
There is pressure on him to work.
He can’t find a job.
He has no options, and there is no social safety net to help him.
He would try to work for the PA [Palestinian Authority] but he doesn’t get
a job because he has no connections.

23. Callister, supra note 6, at 83.
24. STERN, supra note 1, at 20.
25. Id. at 5-6. For a discussion of Stern’s methodology, see id. at xxix-xxxi.
26. Id. at ix. “This book is about . . . deeper feelings – the alienation, the humiliation, and
the greed that fuel terrorism. And it is about how leaders deliberately intensify those feelings to
ignite holy wars.” Id. at xix.
27. See STERN, supra note 1, at 9-10, 32-33, 63-64, 85, 107-08.
28. Id. at 9.
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He tries to get into Arafat’s army, but again, he doesn’t have the right
connections. . . .
He has no girlfriend or fiancée.
On the days he’s off, he has no money to go to the disco and pickup girls
(even if it were acceptable).
No means for him to enjoy life in any way.
Life has no meaning but pain.
Marriage is not an option . . . .
He feels he has lost everything.
The only way out is to find refuge in God.
He goes to the local mosque. . . .
He begins going to the mosque five times a day—even for the 4:00 a.m.
prayers. 29
From there, Hamas will identify the troubled youth and gradually recruit him
with promises of a blessed afterlife by telling him that the family names of
martyrs are held in the highest respect and by providing money for his
family. 30 Hamas knows the potency of humiliation as a weapon and identity as
a currency, especially among those who have so little of it. 31
In 2003, Laurence Iannaccone challenged the popular view that suicide
bombers are socially and economically deprived, as well as frustrated,
cognitively limited, and psychopathic. 32
The substantial body of empirical results reviewed or derived by Krueger and
Maleckova (2003) thus finds “little direct connection between poverty or
[poor] education and participation in terrorism.” Moreover, Berrebi (2003)
finds that Palestinian suicide bombers have substantially more schooling and
better economic backgrounds than the average Palestinian. Berrebi’s statistical
portrait reaffirms the portrait that emerges from Nassra Hassan’s (2001)
interviews with potential Palestinian suicide-bombers, which in turn sounds
exactly like a quote from the literature on cult converts: “None of [the
bombers] were uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded or depressed.
Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs . . . .
Two were son’s [sic] of millionaires.” 33

29. Id. at 50.
30. Id. at 50-51.
31. See id. at 38.
32. Laurence R. Iannaccone, The Market for Martyrs 8 (Mercatus Center, George Mason
University, Global Prosperity Initiative, Working Paper No. 35, 2003), available at
http://www.mercatus.org/pdf/materials/822.pdf (paper delivered to the American Economic
Association).
33. Id. at 9 (citing CLAUDE BERREBI, EVIDENCE ABOUT THE LINK BETWEEN EDUCATION,
POVERTY AND TERRORISM AMONG PALESTINIANS (2003); Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova,
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However, Iannaccone also finds that identity and loyalty play important roles
in the recruitment of suicide bombers. 34 “Although the organizations seek to
motivate potential bombers in many ways, the ‘crucial factor’ is ‘loyalty to the
group,’ promoted by ‘small cells’ and ‘countless hours of intense and intimate
spiritual training.’” 35 Indeed, “camaraderie, power, status, honor, identity,
purpose, . . . powerful emotional experiences, and the prospect of heavenly
rewards” are listed as the diverse “output” offered by religious terrorist
groups. 36
Returning to Stern, shifting demographics play an important role in
In Indonesia, demographic factors, specifically
religious terrorism. 37
government sponsored migration from overpopulated areas to less crowded
regions, have tipped religious and ethnic balances and resulted in violence. 38
In addition, considerable socioeconomic development in Indonesia has
produced a new phenomenon—an urban middle class, which is mostly
Muslim. 39 This new class has had to face the onslaught of modern life, which
can be destabilizing. Stern comments:

Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 119
(2003); Nasra Hassan, An Arsenal of Believers, NEW YORKER, Nov. 19, 2001, at 36-41). A
recent book by Robert Pape, based upon the compilation and analysis of a database covering
every suicide attack from 1980 through 2003 (315 attacks in all), likewise supports this profile.
See generally ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM
1 (2005). “Few suicide attackers are social misfits, criminally insane, or professional losers.
Most fit a nearly opposite profile: typically they are psychologically normal, have better than
average economic prospects for their communities, and are deeply integrated into social networks
and emotionally attached to their national communities.” Id. at 23. Like Iannaccone, Pape takes
the position that suicide campaigns require extensive social networks. See id. at 22 (“Suicide
terrorist organizations often command broad social support.”). Pape also finds that such
“terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation” and is “an extreme strategy for national
liberation.” Id. at 23. While there is conflicting evidence with respect to suicide bombers, Stern
notes that neo-Nazis attracted less-educated youth, but that left-wing groups in Germany and the
United States attracted the “well-educated and relatively wealthy.” STERN, supra note 1, at 80
(citing Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, The Economics and Education of Suicide Bombers:
Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?, NEW REPUBLIC, Jun. 24, 2002). Stern also points out that there
are considerable differences in education depending upon an operative’s place in the hierarchy of
the terrorist organization. “One of the problems of the studies conducted so far is that they
purport to demonstrate the role of socioeconomic factors on terrorism writ large, rather than for
particular groups in a particular place under particular conditions at a particular time.” Id.
34. See Iannaccone, supra note 33, at 9.
35. Id. (citing David Brooks, The Culture of Martyrdom, 289 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 18, 1820 (2002)).
36. Id. at 16. Iannaccone also notes that “a bundled collection of products” or benefits
enable terrorist groups to recruit a broader range of members. Id.
37. See STERN, supra note 1, at 84.
38. Id. at 63.
39. Id. at 69.
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[M]odernity itself creates confusion and fear in part because of a surfeit of
choice . . . . Modernity introduces a world where the potential future paths are
so varied, so unknown, and the lack of authority is so great that individuals
seek assurance and comfort in the elimination of unsettling possibilities. Too
much choice, especially regarding identity, can be overwhelming and even
frightening. Under these circumstances, some people crave closing off
options; they crave discipline imposed from the outside. The “strictness” of
militant religious groups—and the clarity they offer about self and other—is
part of their appeal. 40

In other words, the choices suddenly offered by an “opening” of society, either
democratically or economically, can be quite unsettling, particularly to the allimportant sense of identity. This problem is compounded when migration or
other factors alter the existing power structure of the various ethnic and
religious groups within a community. Such factors could explain why
Palestinian suicide bombers are recruited from upper classes of society. 41
The territorial conflict in Kashmir, as described by Stern, concerns far
more than the physical placement of a border or even nationalism. The
struggle is deeply infused with a sense of recovering lost Islamic identity. One
ex-militant explains the sense of hurt: “Muslims have been overpowered by the
West. Our ego hurts.” 42 Kashmir was just one form of expression of the pain.
Beyond physical boundaries and historical claims to homelands, the battle is
being fought over the territory of identity. 43 Stern captures the sentiments well
by stating: “The bottom line, I now understood, is that purifying the world
through war is addictive. Holy war intensifies the boundaries between Us and
Them, satisfying the inherently human longing for a clear identity and a
definite purpose in life . . . .” 44 As with all of the other factors, territoriality is
but another form of expression of the quest for identity.
In addition to the factors of alienation, humiliation, demographics, and
territoriality, Montgomery McFate 45 and Andrea Jackson 46 point to the

40. Id. (citations omitted).
41. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
42. Stern, supra note 1, at 135. From the same ex-militant:
India’s repression and occupation of Kashmir were factors for us . . . . But nationalism is
only part of what causes Islamic militancy. This wasn’t a fight for freedom, at least for
me. It was a civilizational battle . . . . You have to understand: resolving the nationalist
conflict between Israel and Palestine won’t end the violence. The goal is much bigger—
to recover our lost civilization, to recover the golden age of Islam. Nationalism is only
part of the picture.
Id. at 136.
43. See id. at 135-37.
44. Id. at 137.
45. Dr. Mongomery McFate is an analyst with the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program,
Institute for Defense Analyses.
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relationship of ideology and narrative in forming group identity and
inculcating loyalty. Within Iraq, insurgent groups pushing potent ideologies
supply “identity, purpose, and community in addition to physical economic
and psychological security.” 47 With respect to those ideologies, “[n]arratives
are central to the representation of identity, particularly the collective identity
of groups such as religions, nations, and cultures. Stories about a community’s
history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked, and are
often the basis for strategies, actions, and interpretation of the intentions of
actions.” 48 For instance, despite Quaranic prohibitions, al Qaida members
have referred to a story about the Prophet Muhammad’s betrayal by a Jewish
tribe, known as the Banu Qurayza, for negotiating with his enemies during the
siege of Medina in 627 A.D., and the subsequent beheading of all 600 of the
tribe’s men, as modern justification for decapitating non-Muslims. 49 Indeed
such narratives have operated to undermine U.S. efforts at democracy-building
in Iraq:
To defeat the insurgent narratives, the Coalition must generate a strongercounternarrative. Unfortunately, the Coalition’s main themes – freedom and
democracy – do not resonate well with the population. In Iraq, freedom is
associated with chaos, and chaos has a particularly negative valence expressed
in the proverb: Better a thousand years of oppression than a single day of
anarchy. . . . After witnessing unlawful, disorderly behavior, Iraqis will
occasionally joke: “Ah, so this is democracy.” 50

In the end, ideology in the context of cultural, religious, and national narrative
serves as an important tool in the merchandizing of identity, and consolidating
loyalty, which often is expressed in violent forms of action. “The movement’s

46. Andrea Jackson is the Director of Research and Training at Lincoln Group in
Washington, D.C.
47. Montgomery McFate & Andrea V. Jackson, The Object Beyond War:
Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition, MIL. REV. Jan.-Feb. 2006 at 13,
19, available at http://usaca/eavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb06/.
48. Id. Saddam Hussein was also adept at manipulating ideology and “narrative” to meet his
ends:
Saddam tried to erase tribal culture and influence and bind all of Iraq’s diverse groups
into one new culture by creating a new Iraqi identity – an identity shaped by Iraq’s 6,000year-old culture and traditions, a loyalty that owes all status, benefits and achievements to
Saddam alone.
Judith Yaphe, Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and the New, 7 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 51 (2000).
49. Mohamad Bazzi, Waging ‘Holy’ War, Scholars Decry Ghastly Tactic; Beheadings Gain
Widespread Attention, But They Have No Legitimate Basis in Quranic Ideology, NEWSDAY (New
York), June 24, 2004, at A4, available at LEXIS, News library, Newsday file.
50. McFate & Jackson, supra note 48, at 20. “Democracy is also problematic as an effective
ideology because Islam forms the basis for conceptions of government and authority (despite the
secular views of many Iraqis). The Islamic concept of sovereignty is ground in the notion that
human beings are mere executors of god’s will.” Id.
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ideology clarifies their tribulations and provides a course of action to remedy
those ills.” 51 Accordingly, the relationship of identity, ideology, and narrative
are essential to the application of market for loyalties theory in Iraq.
The summation of alienation, humiliation, demographics, and territory as
factors of identity reflect the broader, psychological aspect of identity. In the
Oxford English Dictionary, identity is defined as “[b]elonging or relating to
identity. . . as in identity crisis, a phase of varying severity undergone by an
individual in his need to establish his identity in relation to his associates and
society as part of the process of maturing.” 52 It is the relationship to the world
at large, or lack thereof, that creates an identity crisis and an opportunity to
command high loyalty prices—such as suicide bombing, service in a militia,
and the hardships and risks of life as a terrorist or insurgent. Consequently,
understanding the dynamics of human behavior with respect to identity in the
context of the market for loyalties theory can provide valuable insight.
C. Elasticity and the Consequences of De-Monopolization
Besides the basic paradigm of the market, the market for loyalties theory
provides additional tools for understanding the impact of loss of monopoly
control over the market, such as in post-war Iraq. Particularly helpful is the
economic concept of elasticity.
1. The Basics of Elasticity
The size of the drop in loyalty as a market is de-monopolized depends
upon the elasticity of the demand curve. Assuming equivalent scaling of the X
(identity) and Y (loyalty) axes, demand curves that are relatively steep—
meaning a relatively small increase in quantity of identity results in a
significant drop in price of loyalty—are considered inelastic. On the other
hand, relatively flat demand curves are said to be elastic: increases in the
quantity of product (identity) have only a small negative effect on loyalty
(price). A demand curve where drops in loyalty equate to increases in identity
are said to be unitary.
For instance, the demand curve in Figure 1 is unitary. At the Monopoly
Point, Q m (for the quantity of identity at the Monopoly Point) equals 14, and
P m (for the price in loyalty) equals 7.14, for a total revenue of approximately
100 units of loyalty. At the Competitive Point, Q c equals 50, and P c is two,
also for a total revenue of 100 units. Indeed, every point along the demand
curve produces total revenue of 100 loyalty units. Consequently, the curve is
said to be unitary with respect to the Monopoly and Competitive Points

51. McFate & Jackson, supra note 48, at 19.
52. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed.)(2nd ed. 1989) (entry 10.c. for identity),
available at http://www.oed.com.
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because the total revenue in the market is unaffected by the drop in loyalty as a
result of an increase in identity production.
In contrast, the demand curve illustrated in Figure 2 below is elastic,
because an increase in the supply of identity and a corresponding decrease in
the price of identity actually results in increased total revenues as the market
descends along the demand curve towards the competition point.

FIGURE 2—ELASTIC DEMAND CURVE
In the example above, revenue at the Monopoly Point is Q m × Pm or (16 ×
6.49), which equals total revenue of 103.84 units of loyalty for the monopolist.
However, revenue for the Competition Point is Qc × Pc or (54 × 2.18), which
equals total revenue of 117.72 units of loyalty for all of the competitors in the
de-monopolized market. The increased quantity of identity has resulted in
increased total loyalty and the demand curve is said to be elastic (since total
revenues respond positively to increased supply). It is also possible to create
scenarios with inelastic demand curves.
In the example using Figure 1 above, the price in loyalty fell from 7.14 to 2
(or 5.14 loyalty units) when the market reached competitive equilibrium. In
contrast, in Figure 2, the price of loyalty fell from 6.49 to 2.18 (or a total loss
of 4.31). The loss in the price in loyalty as a market reaches equilibrium is less
significant with a greater degree of elasticity. The trauma caused by
diminished loyalty is lessened with a more elastic demand curve.
Consequently, understanding the conditions affecting the elasticity of demand
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curves is important to understanding the consequences of de-monopolization of
any information market. All markets, including the market for loyalties, are
not equally affected by a loss of monopoly control.
2. Factors Affecting Elasticity
Four factors affect elasticity: the number of substitute products (or
identities) in the market and their closeness to the good in question; effects
from marginal consumers; complications from wholesale and retail marketing;
and the temporal, informational, and transaction costs necessary for consumers
to learn about and take advantage of competing products. 53
a. Presence of Substitutes
The argument that elasticity or stability increases with additional
substitutes was demonstrated in economic literature in 1926 by Italian
economist Marco Fanno. 54 “Two goods are substitutes if a rise in the price of
one causes an increase in demand for the other.” 55 Essentially, the greater the
number of substitutes for identity competing in the market, the greater the
elasticity of the market and, consequently, the less dramatic any drop in loyalty
as a result of de-monopolization. 56 In addition, how close the substitutes are to
the original product (e.g., Coke is a close substitute of Pepsi but not of orange

53. For the author’s explanation of how each factor affects elasticity, see infra sections
II.C.2.a-d.
54. Marco Fanno, The Elasticity of Demand of Substitute Goods, 3 ITALIAN ECON. PAPERS
99, 115 (1998) [hereinafter The Elasticity of Demand of Substitute Goods]. This article is a
translation of an article originally published in German as: Marco Fanno, Die Elastizität der
Nachfrage nach Ersatzgütern, in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR NATIONALÖKONOMIE 51 (1930). Id. at 99.
The German article was meant to be a synthesis of a much longer Fanno essay that was earlier
published in Italian called: Marco Fanno, Contributo alla Teoria Economica dei Beni Succedanei,
in 2 ANNALI DI ECONOMIA 331 (1925-26). Id. Fanno’s conclusions, following rigorous
theoretical analysis, are made with respect to markets with two competing substitute goods. Id. at
115. However, markets with multiple substitutes would have even greater elasticity. Fanno
notes:
[I]t also applies to the instance in which a good may have more than one substitute, that is
for the instance of more than two goods. In this case the action of each of them accrues
with the others and the elasticity of demand for each of them is, other conditions being
equal, all the greater the number of its substitutes.
Id. The importance of Fanno’s contribution has been recognized in American economic
literature. See Carl L. Alsberg, Economic Aspects of Adulteration and Imitation, 46 Q.J. ECON. 1
(1932); Callister, supra note 6, at 97 n.177.
55. DOUGLAS A.L. AULD ET AL., AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 306 (1983)
(under entry for “Substitutes”). An exception to this rule occurs in the instance of “inferior”
substitutes. When the price of an inferior or weak substitute falls, it may have the unexpected
effect of increasing demand for its substitute. See H. Fabian Underhill, An Overlooked Lesson in
Prices of Substitute Goods, 3 J. ECON. EDUC. 136, 137 (1972).
56. See Callister, supra note 6, at 96-97.
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juice) is also an important factor. 57 Close substitutes make the demand curve
more elastic. 58
A previous article by the author describes, in the form of a function, the
stabilizing effect of substitute identities in the market:

i=

f  k 
 p

“where ‘i’ is the instability, ‘k’ represents the level of new competing identities
being introduced, and ‘p’ is the penetration of previously competing identities,
or substitutes, into the market.” 59 Eventually, in a state that opens itself to
competing identities, if “p” were to approach infinity, the level of disturbance
will grow infinitesimally small (at least with respect to the instability caused
solely by the introduction of new identities):

 
lim k  = 0
 p
p →∞

“Hence, a state in which a diversity of identities flourishes is a supremely
stable one, at least mathematically, with respect to the instability caused by the
introduction of new identities.” 60 This means that the effect of a new political
newspaper, radio station, web site, etc. in the United States is relatively
inconsequential with respect to diminishment of loyalties in the market,
especially compared to the impact of a new media source in a country like preinvasion Iraq or China.
If it is true that the most stable states have reached equilibrium in the
information market, with many groups providing identity and a relatively
stable price in terms of loyalty, why then does the overthrow of a repressive
57. AULD ET AL., supra note 56, at 306.
58. Id.
59. Callister, supra note 6, at 96-97.
60. Id. at 98 (footnotes omitted). Callister notes:
It would not be correct to state:


lim

k 
=0
 p
 

f 

p→∞

This is because a portion of the formula, namely the other factors which impact elasticity
and instability, are unknown. All that is known is that the instability resulting from the
introduction of new identities will approach zero if, in theory only, the number of
previously introduced identities approaches infinity.
Id. at 97 n.178.
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regime often result in such violence and chaos (such as in Iraq)? Why do
information markets ever slide back toward monopolization (as in the Weimar
Republic following World War I)? To answer these questions, other factors
must be considered.
b. Marginal Consumers
The number of consumers (purchasers of identity) does not remain
constant with the addition of substitutes (additional identities). 61 Preferences
for particular identity products and lower prices may induce bystanders to enter
the market to buy, thereby increasing demand and pushing up price (in terms
of loyalty) higher than it would have otherwise been. 62 This is true because
“as there are more and more consumers in the market, there is a greater
likelihood that one of those consumers will have a willingness to pay value a
little less—but very close—to the market [or offered] price of the good.” 63
Such buyers are known as marginal consumers. 64
The important question in Iraq is whether de-monopolization of the
information market is introducing any new consumers—the greater the number
of consumers, the more marginal consumers there will be, which increases
demand. Since the Baathist party favored Sunni and tended to exclude Shi’a
and Kurds (who risked their lives to participate in their own insurgencies in

61. See The Elasticity of Demand of Substitute Goods, supra note 55, at 115.
62. NetMBA.com, Supply and Demand, http://www.netmba.com/econ/micro/supplydemand/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
63. W. Robert Reed & Max Schanzenbach, Prices and Information: A Simple Framework
for Understanding Economics (1996), http://www.ou.edu/class/econ3003/book/area1c6.html (last
visited Jan. 10, 2006).
64. See generally William Novshek & Hugo Sonnenschein, Marginal Consumers and
Neoclassical Demand Theory, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1368 (1973). William Novshek & Hugo
Sonnenschein explain the consequences of an increasing number of consumers, including
marginal consumers, as a challenge to neoclassical economics, which typically only considers
aggregate income and substitution effects (i.e., with respect to a constant number of consumers
and suppliers).
Ask any economist to explain the elasticity of demand for a product, and it is likely he
will speak not only of income and substitution effects but also of “marginal consumers”
who have reservation prices in the neighborhood of the existing price. Nevertheless, most
textbook aggregate demand analysis at the advanced level ignores marginal consumers
when describing price-induced changes in the demand for a single commodity. This is
because, with a finite number of consumers, an infinitesimal change in price will typically
not change the number of consumers with positive demand for a commodity; thus all
changes in demand are properly explained by summing the neoclassical income and
substitution effects.
Id. at 1368-69. However, with a continuous number of consumers, the effect of marginal
consumers cannot be ignored. See id. at 1369.
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pre-occupied Iraq), 65 the number of marginal consumers of identity in the
marketplace has arguably increased by the fall of the Baathists, thereby
strengthening demand and decreasing elasticity. Consequently, loss in the
price of loyalty, as brought about by de-monopolization, may not result in as
drastic an effect. Nevertheless, the price of loyalty, which various groups may
demand for a certain level of identity may still be quite high (a prerequisite for
suicide bombers and the recruiting of insurgents). As shall be discussed
below, this factor may be compounded by the action of exclusive dealing
agreements between suppliers of identity and tribal retailers.
c. Wholesale and Retail Markets
Retail markets complicate economic analysis by the imposition of vertical
restraints on competition to maximize the profits of wholesale suppliers. 66
Such restraints include retail price floors, exclusive territorial rights, minimum
volume requirements, and franchise fees (in addition to wholesale product
prices). 67 Exclusive dealing agreements between suppliers and retailers are
also forms of vertical restraints, although there is no formal vertical
integration, as when a single firm undertakes “successive stages in the process
of production [and distribution] of a particular good.” 68
In Iraq, tribes have functioned as mediators between their members and
Saddam Hussein’s régime.
After the [First Gulf] war, when Saddam felt threatened by the weakening of
law and order and the potential threat to his regime, he resurrected tribal rule.
He rewarded the loyalty of tribal leaders by allowing tribal law to prevail in
many areas and bestowing on them guns, cars and privileges. In return, they
acknowledged his leadership. 69

Such tribal leaders act as retailers and brokers. Like brokers, they tend to
capture their constituents (since they impose high transaction costs for
leaving). 70 However, it is far from clear that they receive a commission (or a
fixed percentage) of the gross sales price (loyalty) for their services. 71 Rather,

65. See Erich Marquardt, Washington’s Delicate Balancing Act: Negotiating Between Iraq’s
Sunni and Shi’a Arabs, POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REPORT, May 7, 2004, http://www.pinr.com
(follow “Archives 2004” hyperlink; then follow “Washington’s Delicate Balancing Act”
hyperlink).
66. G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 27, 27-28 (1984).
67. Id.
68. AULD ET AL., supra note 56, at 333 (under the entry for “vertical integration”).
69. Yaphe, supra note 49, at 55.
70. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
71. This distinction is important because the incentives for brokers tend to maximize volume
of market traffic rather than the highest price for the seller. See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J.
DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROUGE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING
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they exchange loyalty and identity just as their suppliers (Baathists, Shi’a
religious groups, nationalists, etc.) do. The nature of the market can be
explained as follows:
A chief . . . has to prove himself more able to command than his kinsmen;
then, however strong the moral and symbolic authority of the chiefship, he has
to maintain his personal position not only by performing the specific functions
of chiefship, but by rewarding his followers, if not with booty, at least with
lavish entertainment and hospitality; otherwise they may abandon him and
support a rival, even the chief of another tribe . . . . A chief has duties to both
government and followers, and his position is close to that of feudal lord.
Typically he collects tax and military levies, and maintains order for the
government, while for his followers he conducts external political relations,
adjudicates disputes, and (for nomads) allocates pastures and coordinates
migrations. 72

In essence, the sheik serves as the retailer between the members of his tribe
and the state. In Iraq, tribal affiliations determine political appointments,
career opportunities, and social relationships. 73 Furthermore, agreements of
tribal leaders with suppliers tend to be exclusive, as evidenced by the fact that
police units in Iraq tend to be dominated by single tribes. 74 The consequences
of exclusivity are discussed below.
i.

Exclusive Dealing with Consumer Mobility

The consequence of exclusive dealing agreements is greater inelasticity
and more instability upon de-monopolization. 75 The competitive dampening
effect of exclusive-dealing contracts on retail markets is illustrated by two
different scenarios in which there are two suppliers with two products

8-9 (2005). Retailers, on the other hand, must optimize profits with respect to their own costs and
must consider both the sales price and volume in their calculus.
72. Richard Tapper, Introduction, in THE CONFLICT OF TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN AND
AFGHANISTAN 56 (Richard Tapper ed., 1983). Tapper contrasts the chief with brigands and
khans “who [have] gained power through leading a faction but must legitimise [sic] it by ‘tying
the knot’ of a linage group.” Id. at 56-57.
73. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
74. See McFate & Jackson, supra note 48, at 17 (90% of police in Mosul were from the Al
Jaburi Tribe). In addition, Saddam Hussein placed control of key security units and intelligence
agencies in his own tribe, the Bayajat. See Yaphe, supra note 49, at 53. Not only does the
supplier (government) agree to exclusively use a particular tribe, but Islamic tradition reinforces
the exclusivity of loyalty. For a discussion of the Banu Qurayza tribe, see supra note 50, and
accompanying text.
75. See Y. Joseph Lin, The Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing, 34 J.
INDUS. ECON. 209, 210 (1990) (“[T]he perceived demands of the manufacturers are rendered
more inelastic under exclusive dealing, much as if the products had been made more
differentiated.”) (emphasis omitted). The closeness or non-differentiation of substitutes is an
important factor in determining elasticity. See supra section II.C.2.a.
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(identities). In the first scenario, two identity wholesalers have entered into
exclusive contracts with two tribal retailers. Over the period of time
(represented by points A and B), Identity Wholesaler 1 reduces its loyalty price
for Identity Product 1 by twenty units, and so does Tribal Retailer 1 (per
agreement), 76 but Identity Wholesaler 2 makes no such change in price.
Assume for purposes of illustration that tribal members can move between
tribes. 77 Tribal Retailer 2 is motivated to reduce its price by a little less than
20 units (a 20-unit reduction would leave Tribal Retailer 2 with no margin) to
avoid losing customers to Tribal Retailer 1. The Retail Product and Whole
Sale Product demand curves (between points A and B below) illustrate the
intuitive economic outcomes. 78

FIGURE 3—RETAIL MARKETS FOR LOYALTIES (CONSUMER MOBILITY)
Note that in this example the difference between B and B’ for Retail Product 1
(of 30 units) corresponds to the reduction in units sold for B to B’ for Retail
Product 2.
76. The assumption is that a shrewd wholesaler would not agree to lower its price to its
retailers without assurances of corresponding reduction in retail sales prices for the same product
to increase demand. See Lin, supra note 76, at 210.
77. If the opposite were true (i.e., tribal members could not switch allegiances), the net result
would be even less, not more elasticity with respect to the wholesale market (wholesalers could
not expect greater revenues in response to increased demand). See infra note 84 and
accompanying text.
78. Figure is based on Lin’s intuitive example. Lin, supra note 76, at 210-11.
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The loyalty revenues for Tribal Retailers 1 and 2 can be summarized:
Loyalty Revenue at A
(Before Wholesale Price Reduction)
Product 1
Retailer 1
Retailer 2
Total
Revenue

(40 × 80)

Product 2

Loyalty Revenue at B
(After Wholesale Price Reduction)
(60 × 60)

3200
(70 × 30)

Product 2

Product 1

2100

5300

3600
(52 × 30)

1560

5160

TABLE 2—INELASTICITY OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING
While the revenue for Product 1 increases (by 400 units of loyalty), the total
revenues fall from (5300 to 5160) in response to changes in wholesale pricing.
Consequently, nonexclusive dealing retail arrangements tend to promote
inelasticity in the market. 79
ii. Non-Exclusive Dealing
If Identity Wholesalers have not entered into exclusive agreements and
both Tribal Retail Dealers sold both Identity Products 1 and 2, then neither
Tribal Retailer will have any incentive to cut prices on Product 2 because
neither will lose customers who switch to Identity Product 1. Assuming that
the retail loyalty price for Product 1 is reduced (per agreement with the
Wholesaler), 80 the shift of buyers to Identity Product 1 will increase the
quantity of Identity Product 1 sold and produce a more elastic demand curve.
The sales of Identity Product 2 will likely disappear. 81 In this scenario, loyalty
revenues for the Tribal Retailers can be summarized:

79. A mitigating factor may affect the inelasticity of the retailer’s demand curve in an
exclusive dealing arrangement. Id. at 211. When dealers only sell one product, “there are always
more dealers under exclusive dealing than under non-exclusive dealing. The competition among
a larger number of dealers would tend to reduce retail prices.” Id. Iraq has an estimated 23 tribal
confederations, collectively constituting over one hundred tribes. Susan Sachs, The Sheik Takes
Over: In Iraq’s Next Act, the Tribes May Play the Lead Role, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2004, at 14.
The presence of so many tribes within Iraq should operate to drive down retail prices, but only
assuming competition for loyalty suppliers and for tribal members. See infra note 85 and
accompanying text.
80. This is true for the same reasons in the exclusive-dealing arrangement. See supra note
77 and accompanying text.
81. See points A to B’ on Figure 3 for both products.
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Loyalty Revenue at B’
(After Wholesale Price Reduction)
Product 1
Product 2

Retailer 1

(20 × 80)

1600

(20 × 80)

1600

(45 × 60)

2700

(45 × 60)

2700

Retailer 2

(35 × 30)

1050

(35 × 30)

1050

(0 × 70)

0

(0 × 70)

0

Total
5300
5400
Revenue
TABLE 3—ELASTICITY OF NON-EXCLUSIVE DEALING

Consequently, the responsiveness to Identity Wholesaler 1’s price cut under
non-exclusive dealing is more elastic in the market as a whole (5300 to 5400)
than under exclusive dealing. 82 Once again, the consequences of inelasticity
are important when there is a loss of monopoly control, because it indicates
how precipitous the drop in loyalty in the market will be. 83
In effect, exclusive dealership agreements produce less elastic demand
curves than non-exclusive arrangements with respect to retail markets. The
same is true with respect to wholesalers. Under non-exclusive dealerships,
wholesalers who do not react to their competitors’ price changes will find that
their own products do not sell in the wholesale market. However, under
exclusive relationships, a wholesaler is shielded to some extent by the actions
of his or her exclusive retailer, who cuts prices and absorbs the financial
impact to avoid losing customers to another retailer.
iii. Exclusive Dealing Without Consumer Mobility
The scenarios above have assumed mobility of customers or tribal
members among tribal retailers. However, tribal members probably cannot
change their tribal membership, except perhaps through marriage. 84 Lacking
82. See Lin, supra note 76, at 210 (“The overall effect is that the perceived demands of the
manufacturers are rendered more inelastic under exclusive dealing, much as if the products had
been . . . differentiated.”) (emphasis omitted).
83. See supra section II.C.1.
84. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. While an individual may not easily change his
or her tribal affiliation, it does happen. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. In fact,
kinship with a particular tribe may be fictional. Lévi-Straus contended that “kinship structures”
often depend on the relationships of “brothers-in-law” and that the system “does not consist in
objective ties of descent or consanguinity between individuals. It exists only in human
consciousness; it is an arbitrary system of representations, not the spontaneous development of a
real situation.” CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 50 (1963). See generally,
Julian Pitt-Rivers, Kinship: Pseudo-kinship, in 8 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 408-13 (David L. Sills ed., 1968) (using “figurative,” “fictive or artificial,” and
“ritual” kinship as examples of pseudo-kinship). Furthermore, tribes have been “manufactured”
to meet the needs of Hussein régime. See Yaphe, supra note 49, at 56 (“[T]he government
allowed the manufacture of new ‘tribal’ groups based on economic ties or greed . . . . Instead of
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mobility, the market becomes yet even more inelastic under exclusive dealing.
In such instances, the retail price of Identity Product 2 would not be reduced at
all to keep tribal customers from fleeing from Tribal Retailer 2 to Tribal
Retailer 1. In essence, the line represented by A to B’ in Figure 3 would be
essentially vertical (although there might be some slope to the right because of
increased consumption by the members of Tribe 1 in response to the lower
price, but there would be no new customers). 85 See Figure 4 below.

FIGURE 4—RETAIL MARKETS FOR LOYALTIES (NO CONSUMER MOBILITY)
In effect, tribal retailing in this type of exclusive-dealing environment
represents the most inelastic and destabilizing of all possible environments for
Identity Wholesalers. 86

common lineage, territory, and a more agrarian livelihood . . . , the new tribes are led by educated,
middleclass professionals, and civil servants who rent apartments in the city.”).
85. See Figure 4.
86. For discussion of the ability of tribal members to switch allegiance, see supra notes 9
and 85 and accompanying text.
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d. Time, Information Barriers and Transaction Costs
Over time, the demand curves tend to become more elastic. 87 This is
partly because transaction costs (even if possible, changing tribal allegiances,
for instance in the case of marriage, may result in shunning and economic
boycott by family and acquaintances) exist for switching loyalties to
substitutes, 88 and it may take time for consumers to be aware of the presence of
substitutes in the marketplace. 89 “[U]nstandardized commodities that are
purchased infrequently (houses, furs) may be considerably affected by it.
Buyers may also delay shifting to another product until a rise in price [or
decrease in the substitute commodity] appears to be permanent.” 90 In the case
of occupied Iraq, switching loyalties may have significant transaction costs
(the pains of severing social and family relations, readjusting orientation, and
reallocating budgeted loyalties, etc.), which may not be worthwhile until the
new supply of identity is seen as stable and is at a permanently reduced price.
Loyalty to the democratic institutions supported by U.S. efforts may not
present Iraqis with a secure and stable sense of identity; so why bother
switching suppliers in light of the costs? Furthermore, there may be no “going
back” (at least not without significant cost) to old suppliers if the new supplier
of identity suddenly folds. Misperceptions about the extent of loyalty
demanded by new suppliers may also inhibit switching to new suppliers of
identity.
3. Importance of Elasticity – Summary
Elasticity is what determines the extent of destabilization following loss of
monopoly control. 91 Other factors being equal, the price (loyalty) falls a
greater amount to equilibrium on an inelastic demand curve than on an elastic
demand curve. Factors determining the elasticity of the market demand curve
include:
• the presence of substitutes (and competitors supplying substitutes) in
the market;
• the closeness (and relative inferiority or superiority) of those substitutes
to the good (identity) whose price is falling;
87. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 45-47 (1952) (“This belief rests chiefly
on the pervasive potentialities of substitution, which, for example, have consigned to failure every
attempt to defeat an enemy in wartime by destroying some allegedly indispensable resource or
product . . . .”).
88. See id. at 45-46 (technological restrictions to switching consumption among substitutes);
see also id. at 46 (habit and the inertia of readjusting budgets for different purchasing patterns).
89. Id. at 46 (“A price reduction may not be known to all consumers immediately so its full
effects will not be realized immediately.”).
90. Id.
91. For a full discussion of the author’s analysis of the principles of elasticity summarized in
this section, see supra sections II.C.1-2.
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• the number of marginal consumers drawn into the market after demonopolization;
• exclusive dealing agreements with intermediaries or retailers in the
market;
• the presence of information barriers (as to price changes) and
transaction costs, both of which need time to be overcome.
Essentially, the market will be most elastic and least affected by loss of
monopoly control when the market includes marginal consumers, the presence
of a retail market with exclusive dealing arrangements, the absence of
transaction and informational barriers, and competing substitute identities,
which are similar to those in the market prior to de-monopolization.
These factors become extremely important to a nation such as Iraq as they
emerge from under the hegemony of a tyrannical regime with monopolistic
control over the information environment. Even if monopoly control over the
market for loyalties is lost, these other factors relating to elasticity may keep
loyalty prices artificially high, ultimately favoring fanatic devotion of small but
violent segments of society and ensuing reassertion of oligarchic or monopoly
control over the information environment and market for loyalties.
D. Validity of the Application of Neo-Classical Economics to Information
Studies
Some have argued that certain aspects of individual behavior (even in the
context of traditional markets) just cannot be explained by classical economic
theory.
Often these criticisms challenge assumptions of rationality. 92
92. In modern economic theory, “collective action,” “prisoner’s dilemma,” and
“externalities” problems challenge the classical economic assumption that individuals will always
make rational choices to maximize their interests. See J.J. Faffont, Externalities, in 2 NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECON. 263 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); Mancur Olson, Collective
Action, in 1 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECON. 474 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); Anatol
Rapoport, Prisoner’s Dilemma, in 3 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECON. 973, 974 (John
Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). The trouble is that there is a “divergence between individual and
collective rationality.” Rapoport, supra, at 974. This quandary is not simply speculative in
nature, but a practical problem that has been duly noted in the debate surrounding the
government’s need to mandate public interest television.
[P]ublic interest programming can produce social benefits that will not be adequately
captured by the individual choices of individual citizens; the same is true for
programming that produces social costs, including apathy, fear, and increased criminal
activity. Because of the collective action problem, an unregulated market will
underproduce public goods and overproduce public bads.
Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 517 (2000) (citation
omitted). Applying the analysis of collective action and externalities problems, the explanation
for government effort to regulate information flow stems from the need to protect the demand for
its public goods (i.e., it is in the public’s interest to receive a uniform message from broadcasters
and publishers supporting policies and values approved by the state), rather from a drop in price
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Ultimately, economics, like every other theory, is limited in what it can
explain. 93
Stephen Lubet, a law professor at Northwestern University, begins a wellreasoned article on the limits of economics with the statement: “Nothing can
shake your faith in neoclassical economics so much as a visit to the Middle
East.” 94 In his article, Professor Lubet describes in great detail his
unsuccessful attempts to apply neoclassical economic theory on each of three
separate occasions to negotiate a “bargain” fare for a horse ride out of a canyon
containing the ruins of Petra, an ancient fortress city in Jordan. 95 Applying
classical economic analysis, Professor Lubet explores all the possible reasons
that the “market failed to clear.” 96 After considering, and dismissing, all the
possible economic factors (bad bargaining techniques, barriers to information
flow, operation of cartels, opportunity costs, etc). 97 Professor Lubet turns to a
non-economic explanation as to why his Bedouin guides would not accept his
perfectly sensible offer (at least in economic terms):
From a common sense perspective, the answer is painfully obvious. Pride.
They [the Bedouin] were desert horsemen, after all, and they probably were
not thrilled about chauffeuring tourists in the first place. There was an amount
of money that made the work worthwhile, and they just were not interested in
anything less, efficiency be damned. From an economic perspective, on the
other hand, their behavior was irrational. . . . The experience of the [B]edouin
has no doubt emphasized the value of pride, not to mention related virtues such
as determination and group identification. During nomadic life, it seems likely
that pride would be a positive survival feature because it makes one more
willing to endure hardship, value each individual, and protect one’s family and
flock. In other words, the development of stubborn pride should be seen as an
evolutionary adaptation to environmental circumstances. Is it possible that the

(in terms of loyalty) as in Professor Price’s market for loyalties theory. The problem with this
analysis is that oppressive régimes and oligarchs who monopolize the market for loyalties do not
act in such a way as to maximize “public goods.”
93. See, e.g., RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 27 (1983).
My concern is . . . that we economists . . . have lost sight of the limitations of our methods
and, thereby, the limited applicability of the conclusions that have been drawn. More
specifically, in much modern discussion, economists seem to have made an unrecognized
intellectual leap from assuming that the individual has a rational capacity to assuming that
all individual behavior has a rational foundation and is therefore subject to logical
discourse.
Id. (emphasis in original).
94. Steven Lubet, Notes on Bedouin Horse Trade or “Why Won’t the Market Clear,
Daddy?,” 74 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1996).
95. Id. at 1040-41.
96. Id. at 1042-49. “Market clearing” refers to the equilibrium of supply and demand–the
point where a willing buyer and seller agree to an exchange. See id. at 1039.
97. See id. at 1042-49.
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laws of evolution, at least by analogy, might reveal an explanation that the
laws of economics have failed to provide? 98

As Professor Lubet points out, there are some behaviors (particularly irrational
ones) that traditional economics just does not explain. 99 His reference to (and
questioning of) whether the theory of evolution explains certain behaviors is
significant. 100 Evolution is about adaptation and survival, something with
which governments and their constituent power holders are familiar, and often
obsessed with. 101 The ultimate values driving human behavior in the theory of
evolution are different. 102 As Professor Lubet notes, “[a]daptation, after all,
tends only to ensure a level of survival, not to produce perpetually ideal results.
In other words, evolution seeks viability, not optimality.” 103
However, Professor Lubet may have abandoned economics too soon.
Professor Lubet’s market involves the exchange of cash for services. 104
Nevertheless, this is not the exchange that market for loyalties explains. It
accounts for regulatory behavior on a more fundamental level—identity (which
includes fears and hopes concerning survival) and loyalty. Recasting Lubet’s
troubled market at Petra in terms of market for loyalties theory would produce
a very different analysis. Fundamentally, the Arab guides needed identity,
even more than cash. Their own pride and sense of who they are kept them
from providing services (or devoting their loyalty to tourists as their guides)
for any amount below a certain rate. The market did not clear because Lubet
was dealing in the wrong currency. He might have gotten his ride for nothing
if he could have tendered a heavy dose of identity instead of cold cash.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR US INFORMATION POLICY IN OCCUPIED IRAQ
Market for loyalties theory predicts destabilization following loss of
monopoly control over an information environment. The destabilization is the
result of governments and traditional power elites losing their ability to

98. Id. at 1050-51 (citation omitted). Besides criticisms made on the basis of the theory of
evolution and the need to survive, other critics point out the alleged “impoverished” nature of the
economic model of humanity, specifically its failure to consider aesthetics:
“Law and economics” assumes human beings to be fundamentally rationally actors with
economic desires. Such an impoverished understanding of human motivation and
meaning explicitly eliminates the aesthetic dimension. . . . “[L]aw and economics” has a
weak understanding of human beings.
DESMOND MANDERSON, SONGS WITHOUT MUSIC, AESTHETIC DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND
JUSTICE 33 (2000).
99. Lubet, supra note 95, at 1050.
100. See id. at 1051.
101. See id. at 1051, 1051 n.44.
102. See id. at 1050.
103. Id. at 1051.
104. Id. at 1040.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

150

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:123

command the loyalty necessary to exact taxes, military service, commitments
to law and order, etc. If, following a loss of monopoly control, the market
were to rapidly slide to equilibrium, the point where loyalty and identity are
exchanged freely without artificial constraints, then the number of identity
suppliers competing for loyalty would be such that the presence or absence of
any single supplier should no longer have a significant impact on price, in
terms of loyalty, and consequently no destabilizing effects.
However, there are a number of reasons why a market may not slide to
equilibrium following the loss of control by a single or small group of identity
suppliers. First, marginal consumers (previously excluded from the market
because of price or other barriers, such as Kurds and Shiites) may flood the
market and, consequently, keep loyalty prices higher than expected after there
is a loss of monopoly control. Second, the presence of wholesaler and retailers
(in the form of tribal intermediaries) in the market may conspire to artificially
keep prices high, especially if such identity suppliers have entered into
exclusive dealing arrangements or are vertically integrated. Third, information
barriers and steep transaction costs may make it difficult, if not impossible, for
tribal members to switch tribal retailers and readjust their loyalties, especially
if the long-term viability of a new supplier for identity is in doubt.
For U.S. policy in Iraq or other formerly repressed states, there are three
fundamental lessons to be gleaned from market for loyalties theory: the
importance of de-monopolization, the significance of identity, and the primary
of an open market over message.
A.

Importance of De-Monopolization

With the presence of each new purveyor of identity in the market place, the
market should grow more stable, with less trauma from the addition or removal
of any identity supplier. Consequently, the objective in a recently opened
information environment, such as Iraq, is to push towards a market with as
many identity suppliers—diverse political parties, consumer projects, media
outlets, etc.—as possible. Essentially, the freer the flow of information and
expression, the better.
De-monopolization, or specifically the removal of an oppressive régime,
alone will not cause the emergence of a healthy information environment,
conducive to democratic institutions. Other factors such as tribalism may keep
demand for identity high, artificially inflate the price of loyalty, and favor a
predominance in the market by relatively few identity suppliers, who provide
potent, radicalized messages of identity. These suppliers (terrorist groups,
insurgents, etc.) demand a high price in terms of loyalty, which often must be
demonstrated through acts of violence and repression. As a result, the removal
of a single, controlling provider of identity from the market place, such as
Saddam’s régime, without any other measures, may not be effective.
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Diminishment of the loyalty that terrorist, insurgent, and other violent
groups can command is essential. Redirection of loyalty into political
expression, religious observance, careers, education, and material consumption
all work to drive down the loyalty that violent groups can command.
Tribalism, particularly when tribes deal in exclusive relationships with
governments or power groups, artificially holds loyalty prices high and creates
“loyalty barriers” for their members, who are not free to switch allegiances
without dire repercussions. Such tribalism facilitates the very conditions in
which terrorists, insurgents, and other violent groups, which depend on
extreme loyalty from their members, can best operate. Consequently, efforts
must be made to reduce exclusive—dealing relationships among tribes and to
permit tribal members more fluidity in their relationships and affiliations.
B.

Significance of Identity

Nothing fosters loyalty like identity. At every opportunity, the United
States must include a strong sense of Iraq’s heritage, accomplishments, culture,
and future. It must provide support and training to pro-democratic Iraqi
leaders to do the same. Iraq should be consistently referred to as the “cradle of
civilization” and as the “people of Abraham” in order to strengthen
relationships with the West. Particular effort should be made to foster the
emergence of a new, democratic Iraqi identity. For example, the image of the
common Iraqi with a purple finger (signifying individual vote) should be
plastered all over Iraq until it is firmly embedded in every Iraqi’s psyche.
As a corollary to fostering Iraqi identity, every effort must be made to
distinguish violent and repressive groups as at odds with Iraqi identity and
inconsistent with Islam, the spirit of Abraham, and civilized society.
C. Primary of an Open Market Over Message
The objective of the U.S. is not to win Iraqi loyalty for itself, but to create,
maintain, and if necessary, police a market of competing identities, where there
is enough diversity of supply that Iraq is stabilized and no longer at risk from
violent messages of religious extremists, insurgents or other groups.
The three preceding policy recommendations do not constitute a
comprehensive plan for the administration of Iraq or counterinsurgency. Such
a plan would be beyond the scope of this Article and expertise of the author.
Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, both specialists in cultures and
insurgencies, 105 have articulated a more complete set of “tools” to address
insurgencies: “coercive force, economic incentive and disincentive,
legitimating ideology, and traditional authority.” 106 However, all of these tools
bear relationships with market for loyalties theory. As demonstrated by
105. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
106. McFate and Jackson, supra note 48, at 13.
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McFate and Jackson, coercive force must be limited because the “central goal
of an insurgency is not to defeat the armed forces, but to subvert or destroy the
government’s legitimacy, its ability and its moral right to govern.” 107 In other
words, the war is about loyalty. Indeed legitimacy is closely tied to concepts
of identity—the relationship of subjects to their sovereign state. Security is
also an important function of coercive force. “[Vietnamese peasants] will
support the government if and when they are convinced that it offers them a
better life, and it can and will protect them against the [guerrillas]—
forever.” 108 A fearful future, or freedom therefrom, constitutes an important
part of an individual’s identity. 109 “Freedom from fear,” as articulated by
Franklin Roosevelt, 110 was an important part of the U.S. effort to instill loyalty
and bolster national identity during World War II.
Continuing further with McFate and Jackson’s policies—and their
relationship to market for loyalties, including “economic incentives,” humans
have a fundamental need for identity, beyond cash and other tangible benefits,
that guides their choices in ways which confound traditional economics. 111
Even when considering traditional economics (cash, goods, services, standard
of living, etc.), individuals often invest in the future, assigning loyalty to the
groups and causes most likely to pay off in the long run. As already described
above, “ideology” as a tool for legitimization is closely connected with identity
and a key tool for instilling loyalty. 112 Finally, “traditional authority” is
intimately connected with the symbology of identity. McFate and Jackson
describe the power of symbols in legitimizing the authority of Ho Chi Minh in
Vietnam:
Facing the prospects of losing his throne or his life, Buo Dai [the Emperor]
resigned and presented Ho Chi Minh with the imperial sword and sacred seal,
thereby investing him with the mandate of heaven (thien minh) the ultimate
form of traditional authority. Subsequently, Ho ruled Vietnam as if he, too,
were an emperor possessed of a heavenly mandate, even replicating many of
the signs and signals of Vietnamese traditional authority. 113

107. Courtney E. Prisk, The Umbrella of Legitimacy, in UNCOMFORTABLE WARS: TOWARD A
NEW PARADIGM OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT 69 (Max G. Manwaring ed., 1991).
108. CHARLES SIMPSON, INSIDE THE GREEN BERETS: THE FIRST THIRTY YEARS 62 (1983).
109. See McFate & Jackson, supra note 48, at 17-18.
110. Proclamation No. 2570, 7 Fed. Reg. 222 (Nov. 11, 1942). The “Four Freedoms” were
first articulated in a presidential address to Congress on Jan. 6, 1941. See FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, OUR DOCUMENTS: FRANKLIN
ROOSEVELT’S ANNUAL ADDRESS TO CONGRESS - THE “FOUR FREEDOMS”, Jan. 6, 1941,
available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/od4freed.html (includes audio broadcast and text).
111. See, e.g., supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing the example of Bedouin
guides at Petra in Jordan).
112. See supra notes 23, 49-52 and accompanying text.
113. McFate & Jackson, supra note 48, at 23.
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The path to establishing authority often involves ritual and powerful
manipulation of historical, religious and cultural signs—hence, statements like
“[t]o defeat the insurgent narratives, the Coalition must generate strong counter
narrative.” 114 Perhaps so, but this Article’s crowning thesis, and the final U.S.
policy recommendation set forth above, prioritizes sustaining an open
information market (rather than exclusively pinning hopes on winning the
“hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people) as a more productive and achievable
policy objective.
IV. CONCLUSION
Essentially, economic theory, and more specifically, information
economics and market for loyalties theory, has demonstrated the wisdom and
benefit of a freedom of speech and information flow, as well as highlighted
some of the factors impacting the realization of a stable information
environment. During World War II, an important case involving the right not
to salute the flag led Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson (soon to
become the lead prosecutor at the War Crimes Tribunals at Nuremberg) to
articulate the fundamental axiom of United States constitutional law: “If there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.” 115 Not only do freedoms of speech, press, and religion constitute the
“fixed star” of democracy, they are essential to harmony and stability, and
consequently must be a cornerstone of U.S. policy. There is no going back
from the brink of democracy. While tribalism and repressive ideologies hinder
the establishment of a stable market for loyalties in Iraq and Middle East, steps
may be taken to mitigate these inhibitors. Wherever the U.S. seeks to exert its
influence, the market for loyalties and information environment must become
open and free.

114. Id. at 20. See also supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. As a result, the US Army
has developed considerable interest in understanding “adversary culture.” See, e.g., Montgomery
McFate, Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship,
MIL. REV., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 24; Montgomery McFate, The Military Utility of Understanding
Adversary Culture, 38 JOINT FORCE Q. 42 (2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/
jfq_pubs/0438.pdf.
115. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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